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Who participates in undeclared work in the European Union? 
towards a reinforced marginalization perspective 
 
Abstract 
Representations of who participates in undeclared work have adopted either a marginalization 
thesis which holds that undeclared work is conducted disproportionately by the unemployed or a 
reinforcement thesis which holds that it is conducted disproportionately by the employed. 
Reporting a 2013 survey of participation in undeclared work involving 27,563 face-to-face 
interviews conducted in 28 European Union (EU) member states, the finding is that although the 
unemployed are more likely to engage in undeclared work, they undertake only 20 per cent of all 
undeclared work and receive significantly lower earnings from the undeclared economy than 
those in declared jobs, meaning that their participation reinforces their marginalized position 
relative to the employed. Moreover, those in declared employment who benefit least from the 
declared labor market (e.g., younger people, those with financial difficulties) are again more 
likely to engage in undeclared work, but have lower financial gains from their undeclared work 
than those who benefit more from declared employment. The outcome is a tentative call for a 
new reinforced marginalization theoretical perspective which holds that although marginal 
groups are more likely to engage in undeclared work, they gain less from their undeclared work, 
meaning that the undeclared sphere reinforces the marginalization produced by the declared 
economy.  
 
Keywords: informal economy; shadow economy; unemployment; marginalization; labor 
market; European Union 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, a burgeoning sociological literature has emerged both in this journal and beyond 
reporting surveys of how many people are using the undeclared economy as a coping practice to 
secure a livelihood (Abbott and Wallace 2009; Aponte 1997; Boels 2014; Bruns et al. 2011; 
Karjanen 2011; Likic-Brboric et al. 2013; McCann 2000; Morris 2011; Rodgers and Williams 
2009; Round and Rodgers 2009; Williams 2009; Williams and Round 2009). One of the most 
heated current debates in this literature is over who is using the undeclared economy as a coping 
practice. On the one hand, the dominant marginalization thesis asserts that the unemployed 
disproportionately engage in undeclared work and thus that the undeclared economy offsets the 
disparities produced by the declared economy (Ahmad 2008; Castree et al. 2004; Katungi et al. 
20065XELü6DVXQNHYLFK6XUGHMDQGĝOĊ]DN). On the other hand, however, a 
reinforcement thesis has emerged which argues the inverse, namely that that undeclared work is 
disproportionately used by those who have declared jobs rather than the unemployed, meaning 
that the undeclared economy reinforces, rather than reduces, the disparities produced by the 
declared economy (Balabanova and McKee 2002, Kaitedliou et al. 2013, MacDonald 1994, 
Moldovan and Van de Walle 2013, Pahl 1984; Pfau-Effinger and Sakac Magdalenic 2010; 
Williams and Windebank 2001). Until now, nevertheless, the only evidence available to test the 
validity of these competing perspectives has been small-scale studies conducted in particular 
populations. No extensive cross-national surveys have been available to evaluate who 
participates in undeclared work and thus which, if any, of these theses is valid. Here therefore, 
the intention is to fill that gap.  
 In the first section therefore, the competing perspectives regarding who engages in 
undeclared work are reviewed, namely the dominant µmarginalization thesis¶ which holds that 
the unemployed disproportionately conduct such work, and the emergent µreinforcement WKHVLV¶
which argues that such work is disproportionately by those in declared jobs. Identifying that the 
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only evidence so far available derives from small-scale studies of particular populations, the 
second section then begins to fill this gap by introducing the methodology used in an extensive 
2013 Eurobarometer survey of undeclared work. The third section reports the results on the share 
of undeclared work undertaken by the unemployed and those in declared jobs as well as the 
characteristics of the employed who engage in undeclared work, whilst the fourth and final 
section concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings. This will reveal the 
need for a more refined understanding of who participates in undeclared work which transcends 
both the marginalization and reinforcement theses.   
 At the outset however, undeclared work needs to be defined. Reflecting the consensus in 
the scholarly and policy literature, this paper defines undeclared work as paid activities not 
declared to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labor law purposes (Dekker et al. 2010; 
European Commission 2007; OECD 2012; Schneider 2008; Schneider and Williams 2013; 
Williams 2004, 2006; Williams and Windebank 1998). If the paid activities being considered 
differ in additional ways to declared work, then such activities are not defined as undeclared 
work. For example, if the goods and/or services being exchanged are illegal (e.g., illegal drugs), 
then such paid activities are here treated as part of the wider µcriminal¶ economy rather than part 
of the undeclared economy, and if the activities are unpaid then they are part of the separate 
unpaid economy (White and Williams 2010). There are nevertheless some blurred boundaries, 
such as when the rewards for work are in the form of gifts or an in-kind reciprocal favor, rather 
than money. In this paper, however, such activities involving gifts or in-kind favors are excluded 
from the definition of undeclared work. Only paid activities not declared to the authorities for 
tax, social security and/or labor law purposes are included. Even more challenging is the 
discussion regarding the methodology which should be used to measure undeclared work. There 
are three main methods of assessment of the size of undeclared work, namely: direct methods at 
a micro level (i.e. individual, household, company) that aim to determine the size of the 
undeclared sector at one particular point in time (i.e., surveys); indirect methods that use  
various macroeconomic indicators as proxies for the development of undeclared work over time, 
DQG VWDWLVWLFDO PHWKRGV WKDW HVWLPDWH XQGHFODUHG ZRUN DV D µODWHQW¶ variable (for more details 
about these methods please see Schneider and Williams 2013). Here, we use the survey method 
to evaluate who participates in undeclared work. This is because the other methods are used only 
to measure its size, but cannot evaluate who engages in such work.  
 
Competing perspectives on who participates in the undeclared economy 
 
Reviewing the literature, there have been two contrasting perspectives on who participates in 
undeclared work, namely the marginalization and reinforcement theses. Here, each is reviewed 
in turn.  
 
Marginalization thesis 
 
The dominant µmarginalization WKHVLV¶ holds that undeclared work is disproportionately 
conducted by the unemployed who undertake such work out of economic necessity and as a last 
resort due to their exclusion from the declared labor market (Ahmad 2008; Castree et al. 2004; 
Gutmann 1978; Henry 1982; Katungi et al. 2006; Parker 1982; Rosanvallon 19805XELü
6DVXQNHYLFK6XUGHMDQGĝOĊ]DN). This has been a long-standing assertion. During the 
early 1980s recession, Parker (1982: 33) asserted that µwith high unemployment more and more 
people are getting caught up in the web of the underground economy¶, whilst Robson (1988: 55) 
claimed that µthe informal economy is more feasible as an alternative prop to those who are out of 
work...¶. Indeed, so dominant was this marginalization thesis during the 1970s and 1980s that 
Pahl (1988: 249) argued that it was µLQ GDQJHU RI EHFRPLQJ D VRFLDO VFLHQWLVWV¶ IRON P\WK¶. 
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Despite such warnings and the lack of empirical evidence, this perspective has been persistently 
propounded. $V%ODLUDQG(QGUHVDUJXHGGXULQJWKHVµ7KHUROHRIWKHLQIRUPDO
sector in providing a source of support for unemployed workers or individuals receiving public 
DVVLVWDQFHLVDQLPSRUWDQWIXQFWLRQRIWKHXQREVHUYHGVHFWRU¶2UDV6tauffer (1995: 1) put it, µthe 
informal sector can act as an important buffer against unemployment¶ Indeed, this view that 
undeclared work is largely conducted by the unemployed has continued to be voiced since the 
turn of the millennium (e.g., Ahmad 2008; Brill 2011; Castree et al. 2004; Davis 2006; Katungi 
et al. 2006; Slavnic 206WăQFXOHVFX 2004; Taiwo 2013). The result is that undeclared work in 
this perspective is seen to provide the unemployed with a hidden means of livelihood and in 
doing so, to offset the disparities produced by the declared economy.   
This widespread belief that undeclared work is disproportionately conducted by the 
unemployed, however, is more an a priori assumption than an evidence-based finding. Indeed, 
the only evidence supporting such an assertion derives from small-scale studies of particular 
populations such as studies based on small samples conducted in Belfast (Leonard 1994), 
Brussels (Kesteloot and Meert 1999) and Romania (6WăQFXOHVFX 2004). For example, 
6WăQFXOHVFXILQGVWKDWSHUFHQWRIthe Romanian households surveyed earn undeclared 
incomes, but 61 percent of the households in which all members are non-employed. Until now, 
no extensive cross-national surveys have been conducted of the proportion of undeclared work 
conducted by the unemployed and whether it is widely valid that undeclared work is 
disproportionately undertaken by the unemployed. Similarly, women are claimed to be more 
likely to participate in undeclared work than men (ILO 2013; Leonard 1994), those less educated 
more likely than those with better education (Brill 2011; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013), those with 
financial difficulties more likely than more affluent population groups (Katungi et al. 2006; 
Williams 2004) and that participation in undeclared work is greater in less affluent areas 
(Schneider and Williams 2013; Williams et al. 2013; Williams and Windebank, 2001). For 
example, undeclared work is more widespread in less affluent areas of Europe, with some quarter 
of the national income in the post-communist economies of Central and Eastern Europe not 
declared to the authorities and an equivalent proportion of employment in the undeclared 
economy (Schneider and Williams, 2013). 
 
Reinforcement thesis 
 
Over the past few decades, a reinforcement thesis has emerged which argues the inverse, namely 
that undeclared work is disproportionately undertaken by those in declared jobs and thus that the 
undeclared economy reinforces, rather than reduces, the inequalities produced by the declared 
economy (Blalabanova and McKee 2002, Kaitedliou et al. 2013, MacDonald 1994, Moldovan 
and Van de Walle 2013). Again, the evidence supporting this thesis has so far been only in the 
form of small-scale studies based on small samples undertaken in France (Foudi et al. 1982), 
Germany (Pfau-Effinger and Sakac Magdalenic 2010), Greece (Hadjimichalis and Vaiou 1989), 
Italy (Mingione 1991), Lithuania (Krumplyte and Samulevicus 2010), the Netherlands (Van 
Geuns et al. 1987), Poland (Surdej and Slezak 2009), Portugal (Lobo 1990b), Romania (Jutting 
et al. 2009), Spain (Lobo 1990a), the UK (Pahl 1984; Williams 2001, 2004, 2006; Williams and 
Windebank 2001) and Sweden (Persson and Malmer 2006).  
 For example, a Swedish survey reveals that whilst 13 percent of the surveyed population 
engages in undeclared work, 9 percent of the registered unemployed do so (Persson and Malmer 
2006). Pedersen (2003) meanwhile, identifies that the unemployed constitute only a small 
proportion of the undeclared workforce: 20.7 percent in Germany, 9.9 percent in Denmark and 
9.2 percent in the UK. In East-Central Europe similarly, Wallace and Haerpfer (2002) identify 
that just 5 percent of undeclared workers in East-Central Europe are unemployed people 
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receiving benefits, and Surdej and Slezak (2009) in Poland that the unemployed represent just 16 
percent of undeclared workers.  
 Similarly, it has also been asserted that women are less likely to participate in undeclared 
work than men (Lemieux et al. 1994; McInnis-Dittrich 1995) and those with financial difficulties 
less likely to participate than more affluent population groups (Williams 2004; Williams et al. 
2013). 
 Given these two apparently mutually exclusive viewpoints on who engages in undeclared 
work, and that the only evidence in support of either view comes from small-scale studies of 
particular populations, attention now turns to bridging this gap. Here, we report a contemporary 
extensive survey of who engages in undeclared work conducted across all 28 member states of 
the European Union in order to evaluate the dominant view that marginalized groups are more 
likely to participate in undeclared work, by testing the following propositions that analyse on the 
one hand, whether the unemployed or employed participate more in undeclared work and on the 
other hand, whether it is also marginalized groups of the employed that are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work:  
 
Marginalization hypothesis 
H1 The unemployed are more likely to participate in undeclared work than the employed.  
 
Socio-demographic hypotheses 
H2a: Employed women are more likely to participate in undeclared work than employed 
men. 
H2b: Employed younger age groups are more likely to participate in undeclared work 
than employed older age groups. 
H2c: Employed unmarried groups are more likely to participate in undeclared work than 
employed married individuals. 
H2d: Those employed groups who self-define themselves as working class are more 
likely to participate in undeclared work than those defining themselves as middle or 
higher class. 
H2e: Those employed groups with fewer years in formal education are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those who spent longer in formal education. 
H2f:  Those employed who live in a single person household are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those living in households with more than one 
occupant. 
H2g: Those employed with children are more likely to participate in undeclared work 
than those with no children. 
H2h: Those employed with low tax morale are more likely to participate in undeclared 
work than those with high tax morale. 
 
Socio-economic marginalization hypotheses 
H3a: Manual workers are more likely to participate in undeclared work than other groups 
of employed people. 
H3b: Those employed with financial difficulties are more likely to participate in 
undeclared work than those without financial difficulties. 
 
Spatial hypotheses 
H4a: Employed people living in rural areas are more likely to participate in undeclared 
work than the employed living in urban areas. 
H4b: Those employed living in less affluent European regions are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those living in more affluent EU regions. 
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Methodology: examining participation in undeclared work 
 
For this analysis we use Special Eurobarometer No. 284 entitled Undeclared Work in the 
European Union, conducted as part of wave 79.2 of the Eurobarometer survey. In April and May 
2013, 27,563 face-to-face interviews were conducted in all 28 member states of the European 
Union member, of which 12,994 were conducted with people in declared jobs. These interviews 
were conducted face-to-face in the national language with adults aged 15 years and older. In 
every country, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was used (the number 
of interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 1,500 in larger nations). This methodology 
ensures that on the variables of gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as for 
each level of sample (i.e., each European country), is representative in terms of the proportion of 
interviews conducted with each group. For the univariate analysis therefore, we employed the 
sampling weighting scheme as the literature suggests (Sharon and Liu 1994; Solon et al. 2013; 
Winship and Radbill 1994). For the multivariate analysis however, there is a debate over whether 
such a weighting scheme should be used (Pfeffermann 1993; Sharon and Liu 1994; Solon et al. 
2013; Winship and Radbill 1994). Reflecting the majoritarian view, the decision has been taken 
here not to do so.   
The face-to-face interview schedule adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive 
TXHVWLRQV7KLVILUVWO\DVNHGTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVundeclared work 
and having established some rapport, the second section then asked questions regarding their 
purchase of goods and services on an undeclared basis in the last 12 months along with their 
reasons for doing so and thirdly, questions regarding their supply of undeclared work including 
the type of work conducted, hours spent, the average remuneration per hour, who they did the 
work for and their reasons for doing so. Socio-demographic data was collected on their current 
occupational status, gross formal income, age, gender, education, hours worked in formal 
employment and so forth. Analyzing the responses of interviewers regarding the perceived 
reliability of the interviews, the finding is that cooperation was deemed bad in less than 1 per cent 
of the interviews. Cooperation was deemed excellent in 67 per cent, fair in 27 per cent and 
average in 5 per cent.  
To analyze the findings, descriptive statistics are produced on the participation of the 
employed and non-employed in the undeclared economy whilst multilevel mixed-effects logistic 
regression analysis is used to analyze the characteristics of those in declared employment who 
participate in the undeclared economy. To do this, the hypothesis is that participation in 
undeclared work varies according to socio-demographic, socio-economic variables and spatial 
characteristics. The dependent variable thus measures whether respondents participated in the 
XQGHFODUHGHFRQRP\DQGLVEDVHGRQWKHTXHVWLRQ³$SDUWIURPUHJXODUHPSOR\PHQWKDYH\RX
\RXUVHOI FDUULHG RXW DQ\ XQGHFODUHG SDLG DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH ODVW PRQWKV"´ The independent 
socio-demographic, socio-economic variables and spatial variables used to analyze who 
participates in undeclared work are derived from previous studies (Williams and Horodnic 
2015a,b, 2016a,b; Williams et al. 2015) and are as follows: 
 
Socio-demographic independent variables:  
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for males and 0 for females. 
x Age: a categorical variable for the age of the respondent with value 1 for those aged 15 to 24 
years old, value 2 for those aged 25 to 34, value 3 for those aged 35 to 44, value 4 for those 
aged 45 to 54, value 5 for those aged 55 to 64, and value 6 for those over 65 years old. 
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x Marital Status: a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with value 1 for 
married/ remarried individuals, value 2 for cohabiters, value 3 for singles, value 4 for those 
separated or divorced, and value 5 for widowed and for other form of marital status. 
x Social class: a categorical variable for the respondent perception regarding social class of 
society to which s/he belongs with value 1 for the working class of society, value 2 for middle 
class of society, value 3 for higher class of society, and value 4 for other or none. 
x Age when stopped full time education: a categorical variable for age of the respondent when 
stopped full time education with value 1 for 15 years old and under, value 2 for 16-19 years 
ROGYDOXHIRU\HDUVROGRURYHUDQGYDOXHIRU³VWLOOVWXG\LQJ´ 
x People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 2 for 
two persons, value 3 for 3 persons, and value 4 for 4 persons or more.  
x Children (up to 14 years old in the household): a categorical variable for number of children 
with value 1 for individuals with no children, value 2 for the presence of children less than 10 
years old live in respondent`s household, value 3 for the presence of children aged 10 to 14 
years old live in respondent`s household and value 4 for the presence of children less than 10 
years old and children aged 10 to 14 years old live in respondent`s household. 
x Tax morality index: Constructed index of self-reported tolerance towards tax 
non-compliance. 
Socio-economic independent variables: 
x Ocupation: a categorical variable grouping employed respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for those self-employed, value 2 for managers, value 3 for other white collars, and 
value 4 for manual workers. 
x Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for whether the respondent witnessed 
difficulties in paying bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for 
occasionally, and value 3 for almost never/never. 
Spatial independent variable: 
x Area respondent lives: a categorical variable for the urban/rural area where the respondent 
lives with value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 
3 for large urban area. 
x Region: a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with value 1 for the 
Western Europe region, value 2 for the Southern Europe region, value 3 for the East-Central 
Europe region, and value 4 for the Nordic nations region. 
 
Findings: who participates in the undeclared economy? 
 
The marginalization thesis asserts that undeclared work is disproportionately conducted by the 
unemployed whilst the reinforcement thesis argues that it is disproportionately undertaken by 
those in declared jobs. Table 1 evaluates the participation of the employed and unemployed in the 
undeclared economy in the European Union. This reveals that whilst 4 percent of participants 
report engaging in undeclared work in the 12 months prior to interview, 9 percent of those 
defining their employment status as unemployed reported doing so. At first glance therefore, the 
marginalization thesis appears validated.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Nevertheless, although the unemployed have higher participation rates than the employed in 
undeclared work in the EU-28, they only conduct a small proportion (20 percent) of all 
undeclared work and earn on average 80 percent less than the employed from their undeclared 
work, meaning that the unemployed earn just 18 per cent of all undeclared income in the EU-28.   
Those in declared employment, meanwhile, although 49 percent of the surveyed 
population, conduct 50 percent of all undeclared work and receive 51 percent of total income 
from undeclared work. As such, although an unemployed person is more likely to engage in 
undeclared work than an employed person (9 per cent of the unemployed compared with 4 per 
cent of the employed conduct undeclared work), only 20 per cent of all undeclared work is 
conducted by unemployed people. This, therefore, refutes the marginalization thesis. However, 
neither is undeclared work disproportionately conducted by the employed as argued by the 
reinforcement thesis. Instead, the employed engage in a level of undeclared work proportionate 
to their overall population size.  
The result is that there is a need to transcend both the marginalization and reinforcement 
theses. +HUH ZKDW ZH UHIHU WR DV D µUHLQIRUFHG PDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH LV DGYRFDWHG
Reflecting the results, this holds that although the unemployed disproportionately engage in 
undeclared work, their participation reinforces their marginalized position relative to the 
employed, since they receive significantly lower earnings from their undeclared work than those 
in declared jobs who work in the undeclared economy, meaning that undeclared work reinforces, 
rather than reduces, the marginalized position of the unemployed.  
Who amongst the employed however, engages in undeclared work? Do all groups of the 
employed equally participate in undeclared work and benefit to the same extent from their work 
in the undeclared economy? Or is it the case that those groups of employed who benefit least 
from declared employment (e.g., women, the working class, manual workers, younger age 
groups, populations living in poorer areas) also benefit least from undeclared work? To answer 
these questions, we here analyze the hypothesis that the participation of the employed in 
undeclared work varies according to socio-demographic variables, socio-economic variables and 
spatial characteristics. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on the socio-demographic, socio-economic and 
spatial characteristics of the employed who engage in undeclared work. This reveals that some 
groups of the employed who benefit less from their employment in the declared economy are 
more likely to engage in undeclared work but earn on average less when they do so. Younger 
people in declared jobs for example are more likely than older people in declared jobs to 
participate in the undeclared economy but earn less when they do so, as do manual workers, those 
who spent fewer years in formal education, those who define themselves as working class and 
declared employees who have difficulties paying the household bills most of the time compared 
with those who do not. As such, it appears that some groups of the employed who benefit less 
from declared employment are more likely than those who benefit more from employment in the 
declared economy to engage in undeclared work. This, however, is not universally the case. 
Women who are in declared jobs, for example, are less likely to engage in undeclared work than 
men in declared employment, although they earn more when they do engage in the undeclared 
economy. Furthermore, the most affluent European region, namely the Nordic nations, has the 
highest participation rate in undeclared work (6 per cent). The participation rate in undeclared 
work in East-Central Europe is 5 per cent, 4 per cent in Western Europe and 3 per cent in 
Southern Europe. This therefore, provides tentative support for the reinforcement thesis rather 
than the marginalization thesis when considering the European regional variations in 
participation in such work. This is further reinforced when average earnings are examined. 
(PSOR\HG SHRSOH OLYLQJ LQ 1RUGLF QDWLRQV HDUQ IURP XQGHFODUHG ZRUN RQ DYHUDJH ¼
FRPSDUHGZLWK¼57 in East-Central Europe. On the whole, nevertheless, it appears from these 
descriptive statistics that those in declared employment who benefit less from the declared 
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economy (e.g., the working class, manual workers, younger age groups, populations living in 
poorer areas) are more likely to participate in undeclared work and to earn less when they do so. 
The tentative intimation, therefore, is that undeclared work it is the groups of employed people 
who benefit less from the declared economy who are more likely to also undertake undeclared 
work and to earn less when they do so.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To further analyze this, we here conduct a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analysis to 
understand whether these various socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial characteristics 
continue to significantly influence the likelihood of the participation of the employed in 
undeclared work when the other variables are held constant. To do this, an additive model is 
used. The first stage model (M1) examines various socio-demographic factors to examine 
whether each has any association with the participation of the employed in undeclared work, 
while the second stage model (M2) adds a range of occupational factors alongside the 
socio-demographic factors, and the third stage model (M3) adds spatial factors to the 
socio-demographic and occupational factors to examine whether they are associated with the 
participation of the employed in the undeclared economy. Table 3 reports the results. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows that younger people who have declared jobs are significantly more 
likely to engage in undeclared work than older people in declared jobs (confirming H2b), as are 
single people compared with married/remarried people (confirming H2c), the working class 
compared with the middle and higher class (confirming H2d), those living in single-person 
households (confirming H2f) and those who hold non-conformist attitudes towards tax 
compliance compared with those who adhere to the rules, regulations and laws (confirming 
H2h). This is important because it reveals that those employed who are marginalized in the sense 
that their norms, values and beliefs regarding undeclared work do not conform to the formal 
institutions (i.e., the codes, regulations and legislation) are more likely to participate in such 
work (Williams and Martinez 2014a,b). The implication therefore, is that tax morality may well 
be a useful proxy indicator of the level of participation in the informal economy. However, 
women in declared jobs are found to be less likely to participate in undeclared work than men in 
declared jobs (refuting H2a). However, no evidence is found that the age those in employment 
stopped their full time education has an association with participation in undeclared work 
(refuting H2e), nor the number of children (refuting H2g). 
When Model 2 adds the socio-economic factors of occupation and financial 
circumstances people face to the socio-demographic variables, there are no major changes to the 
association of the socio-demographic variables with the likelihood of participation in undeclared 
work. However, the additional finding is that occupation is significantly associated with the 
likelihood to undertaken undeclared work. Self-employed people are significantly more likely to 
engage in undeclared work compared with all categories of employee (refuting H3a). So too does 
the difficulty of paying household bills have a significant influence. Those in declared jobs who 
most of the time have difficulties paying the household bills are more likely to participate in 
undeclared work than those in employment who seldom have such difficulties (confirming H3b). 
Put another way, they are more likely to be forced into undeclared work out of necessity to make 
ends meet and as a last resort than those witnessing fewer financial difficulties.   
When spatial factors are added in Model 3, the finding is that there are no major changes 
to the significance of the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics discussed above 
in relation to the participation of those in declared employment in undeclared work and the 
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directions of the associations remain the same. However, although there is no evidence to support 
the view that those in employment living in more marginal rural areas are more likely to engage 
in undeclared work than those living in more urban areas (refuting H4a), those in employment 
living in the more affluent EU region of the Nordic nations are found to be more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those living in Western Europe, and those living in Southern 
Europe are less likely (refuting H4b).  
Introducing the spatial variables in Model 3 (including the contextual variable EU 
region) reduce the intra-class correlation compared with when only socio-demographic and 
socio-economic variables are included (Model 1 and Model 2). The intra-class correlation has 
lowered to 0.076 from the initial 0.122 of the previous model (Model 2). This indicates that 7.6 
per cent of the variation in the likelihood of participating in undeclared work is due to country 
level differences across the EU countries. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
To evaluate who engages in undeclared work in Europe and thus the validity of the 
marginalization and reinforcement theses, this paper has reported the results of the first extensive 
contemporary survey of who participates in the undeclared economy, namely the 2013 
Eurobarometer survey which involves 27,563 face-to-face interviews in the 28 member states of 
the European Union. This has revealed that in the EU-28 as a whole, that the unemployed 
disproportionately engage in undeclared work but their participation reinforces their 
marginalized position relative to the employed, since they receive significantly lower earnings 
from their undeclared work than those in declared jobs who work in the undeclared economy. 
The result is that undeclared work reinforces, rather than reduces, the marginalized position of 
the unemployed in Europe. Moreover, many of those in declared employment who benefit less 
from the declared economy (e.g., the working class, manual workers, younger age groups, 
populations living in poorer areas) are more likely to participate in undeclared work and to earn 
less when they do so. This finding regarding the employed who engage in undeclared work 
further consolidates the notion that undeclared work reinforces, rather than reduces, the 
disparities produced by the declared economy. 
 Examining the theoretical implications of these findings, the result is that a tentative call 
is made for a rejection of both the marginalization and reinforcement theses and instead, for the 
adoption of D QHZ µUHLQIRUFHG PDUJLQDOization¶ WKHVLV UHJDUGLQJ ZKR HQJDJHV LQ XQGHFODUHG
work. This holds that although marginal groups are more likely to engage in undeclared work, 
they gain less from their undeclared work, meaning that the undeclared sphere reinforces the 
marginalization produced by the declared economy. In the EU-28, this has been found to apply to 
not only the unemployed but also various groups of the employed such as younger people, those 
with financial difficulties in paying the household bills, the working class and those living in 
poorer EU regions. Whether similar findings prevail when examining other global regions, 
especially developing countries, and also at other spatial scales such as within particular nations, 
regions and localities, now needs to be evaluated. This will then allow the development of a more 
nuanced and context-bound understanding of QRWRQO\ZKHWKHUWKHµUHLQIRUFHGPDUJLQDOization¶
thesis applies more widely and deeply across the global economic landscape but also the 
development of a more nuanced understanding of the marginalized groups to which this applies 
in different contexts. 
 In sum, this paper has for the first time provided an evaluation using extensive data of 
who participates in the undeclared economy and thus enabled the marginalization and 
reinforcement theses to be evaluated critically. This tentatively displays the need for a new 
theorization of who participates in the undeclared economy which transcends the marginalization 
DQG UHLQIRUFHPHQW WKHVHV 7KLV QHZ µUHLQIRUFHG PDUJLQDOization¶ WKHVLV asserts that although 
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marginal groups are more likely to engage in undeclared work, they gain less from their 
undeclared work, meaning that the undeclared sphere reinforces the marginalization produced by 
the declared economy. If this paper now stimulates further research to both evaluate the validity 
of this new thesis elsewhere as well as develop a more nuanced understanding of which marginal 
groups are most likely to participate in undeclared work, it will have fulfilled its objective.  
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Table 1  Participation in undeclared work of employed, unemployed and non-employed in 
the EU-28, 2013 
 % engaging in 
undeclared 
work 
% of all 
undeclared 
work 
conducted by: 
% of 
surveyed 
population 
Mean annual 
undeclared 
income/ 
undeclared 
workHU¼ 
% of total 
undeclared 
income 
earned by:  
EU-28 4 100 100 723 100 
Unemployed 9 20 9 696 18 
Other non-employed 3 30 42 511 31 
Employed 4 50 49 865 51 
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Table 2. Participation of the employed in undeclared work in the EU-28: socio-demographic, 
socio-economic and spatial variations 
 % 
engaged 
in 
undeclar
ed work 
Earnings from undeclared work: 
¼1-
100 
(%) 
¼101-
200 
 (%) 
¼201- 
500 
 (%) 
¼501-
1000 
 (%) 
¼1000+ 
(%) 
Don`t 
remember
/ know, 
refusal 
(%) 
Mean 
(¼) 
Gender Men 5 19 4 16 12 15 34 835 
 Women 3 25 12 16 10 14 23 914 
Age 15-24 7 39 6 25 3 18 9 617 
 25-34 5 24 4 14 14 16 28 819 
 35-44 3 12 11 15 12 16 34 1243 
 45-54 3 18 6 16 11 8 41 659 
 55-64 2 8 11 16 13 23 29 1138 
 65+ 2 12 0 0 5 12 71 1135 
Marital status Married/ remarried 3 20 7 15 7 14 37 872 
 Unmarried/cohabitating 6 23 6 22 11 15 23 890 
 Unmarried/single 5 25 10 16 17 15 17 751 
 Divorce/separated 5 7 5 8 13 19 48 1289 
 Widowed/other 3 21 0 1 11 0 67 363 
Social class Working class 5 12 8 16 11 12 41 883 
 Middle class  3 25 7 18 10 19 21 919 
 Higher class  2 82 3 0 4 4 7 175 
 Other/ none 9 46 1 1 44 7 1 406 
Age education ended <15 5 13 6 15 19 14 33 1044 
 16-19 4 22 7 15 8 14 34 754 
 20+ 3 20 8 20 13 15 24 970 
Adults in household One 5 12 9 21 16 13 29 804 
 Two 3 15 7 18 11 17 32 973 
 Three 4 39 5 11 10 10 25 754 
 Four and more 3 32 3 5 5 20 35 773 
Children  <10 years old 4 15 3 19 10 26 27 1168 
 10-14 years old 4 23 9 16 17 8 27 673 
 <10 and 10-14 4 29 17 4 12 5 33 455 
 No children 4 22 7 17 10 13 31 815 
Occupation Self-employed  6 18 13 6 10 19 34 1214 
 Managers 2 31 5 19 6 8 31 671 
 Other white collars 3 21 8 25 11 19 16 925 
 Manual workers 4 19 4 18 13 13 33 722 
Difficulties paying bills Most of the time 8 28 6 17 11 12 26 614 
From time to time 5 11 5 20 10 17 37 1137 
Almost never/never 3 26 10 13 12 12 27 693 
Area Rural area or village 4 13 4 20 12 15 36 1038 
 
Small or middle sized 
town 
4 18 11 16 11 16 28 885 
 Large town 4 35 4 12 11 13 25 645 
EU region EU 28 4 21 7 16 11 15 30 865 
 Western Europe 4 31 7 16 11 15 20 682 
 Southern Europe 3 4 3 9 15 24 45 1908 
 East-Central Europe 5 13 9 21 10 4 43 457 
 Nordic nations 6 19 8 18 12 30 13 1485 
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Table 3. Multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression of the participation of the employed in 
undeclared work in the European Union 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender (CG: Women):    
Men 0.717*** (0.0945) 0.720*** (0.0968) 0.718*** (0.0968) 
Age (CG: 15-24):    
25-34 -0.582*** (0.173) -0.607*** (0.176) -0.598*** (0.177) 
35-44 -0.914*** (0.182) -0.977*** (0.185) -0.979*** (0.185) 
45-54 -1.113*** (0.186) -1.167*** (0.189) -1.171*** (0.189) 
55-64 -1.244*** (0.218) -1.319*** (0.223) -1.329*** (0.222) 
65+ -1.010*** (0.373) -1.267*** (0.392) -1.301*** (0.392) 
Marital status: (CG: Married/Remarried)    
Cohabitating 0.0743 (0.131) 0.0624 (0.133) 0.0585 (0.133) 
Single -0.332** (0.166) -0.369** (0.168) -0.359** (0.167) 
Divorced/Separated 0.120 (0.184) 0.0667 (0.185) 0.0707 (0.185) 
Widowed/ Other 0.0428 (0.276) -0.0238 (0.286) -0.0244 (0.286) 
Social class, self-assessment (CG: The working class of society)   
The middle class of society -0.307*** (0.0990) -0.203* (0.106) -0.206* (0.106) 
The higher class of society -0.600* (0.319) -0.428 (0.324) -0.431 (0.324) 
Other/none -0.319 (0.460) -0.446 (0.477) -0.457 (0.477) 
Age stopped full time education (CG: 15- years):   
16-19 -0.201 (0.189) -0.172 (0.192) -0.207 (0.193) 
20+ -0.140 (0.198) -0.0346 (0.205) -0.0739 (0.205) 
Number 15+ years in household (CG:1 person):   
2 persons -0.431*** (0.153) -0.417*** (0.155) -0.406*** (0.155) 
3 persons -0.249 (0.167) -0.240 (0.168) -0.227 (0.169) 
4 persons -0.398** (0.186) -0.363* (0.188) -0.346* (0.189) 
Number of children: (CG: No Children)    
Children < 10 0.0465 (0.130) -0.0385 (0.132) -0.0418 (0.132) 
Children 10-14 -0.0621 (0.172) -0.115 (0.173) -0.121 (0.173) 
At least one child<10 and at least one 10-14 0.271 (0.188) 0.159 (0.191) 0.139 (0.192) 
Tax morality 0.395*** (0.0232) 0.382*** (0.0238) 0.380*** (0.0239) 
Occupation (CG: self-employed)    
Managers  -0.745*** (0.157) -0.752*** (0.157) 
Other white collars  -0.713*** (0.149) -0.722*** (0.149) 
Manual workers  -0.623*** (0.130) -0.641*** (0.130) 
Difficulties paying bills last year (CG: Most of the time)   
From time to time  -0.468*** (0.135) -0.487*** (0.135) 
Almost never/never  -1.029*** (0.144) -1.066*** (0.144) 
Area respondent lives (CG: Rural area or village):   
Small/middle sized town   -0.0415 (0.109) 
Large town   -0.0274 (0.119) 
Region: (CG: Western Europe)    
Southern Europe   -0.887*** (0.344) 
East-Central Europe   0.124 (0.269) 
Nordic Nations   0.774** (0.394) 
Constant -3.161*** (0.336) -1.958*** (0.381) -1.822*** (0.413) 
Observations 11,616 11,541 11,539 
Number of groups 28 28 28 
Random-effects Parameters    
Identity: Country      
Variance (constant) 0.323*** 0.458*** 0.271*** 
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 0.090 0.122 0.076 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
